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LOCURTO V GUILTANI. AGENCY HEARINGS AND DUE
PROCESS - SECOND CIRCUIT DECISION COMPELS
RELIANCE ON STATE REMEDIES WHEN
CONFRONTING BIAS
I.

INTRODUcriON -

THE IssuE

Controversial cases can take ironic turns. And it's anyone's guess
whether this prospect has been lost among the parties involved in the
on-going civil rights action of Locurto v. Giuliani.'
The suit pits former Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, his Police and Fire
Commissioners, Howard Safir and Thomas Von Essen, and the City of
New York ("City") against former police officer Joseph Locurto and
former firemen Robert Steiner and Jonathan Walters. 2 The three
plaintiffs were fired from City employment following their participation in an annual Labor Day Parade in Broad Channel, Queens, on
September 7, 1998; a parade in which they donned blackface and rode
atop a float entitled "Black to the Future: 2098."3
Following their termination, the plaintiffs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2000), filed suit in federal court alleging that their disciplinary
hearings violated due process 4 and that they had been denied their
First Amendment rights to free speech. 5 As a result, Judge John E.
Sprizzo 6 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York found himself grappling with issues of fundamental fairness
in a case that arose out of one of the worst displays of municipal employee bad judgment in recent memory.
Section 1983 is the modem codification of an 1871 law that was
7
officially entitled "An Act to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment." It
reads in part
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
1. Locurto v. Giuliani, 95 F.Supp.2d 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
2. See id. at 162.
3. Id. at 163.
4. See id. at 167.
5. See id. at 162, 163.
6. See id. at 162.
7. RICHARD BARDOLPH, THE CIVIL RIGHTS REcoRD: BLACK AMERICANS AND
53 (Thomas Cromwell Co., 1970).

THE LAW

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
8
proceeding...
Congress created the statute to address overwhelming Southern
resistance to the post-Civil War Amendments to the Constitution; and,
from its inception, it was commonly referred to as the Ku Klux Klan
Act.9 Considering the well-documented conduct of the plaintiffs in this
case, it is ironic that they initiated this action to enforce their rights
under a statute originally designed to confront racist behavior in the
South.
In response to the plaintiffs' claims, former Mayor Giuliani and
the other defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on two
grounds. First, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs were attempting to relitigate the findings made during the administrative hearings
that led to the their firings10 and that their suit should be barred
under the principles of preclusion."' Second, the defendants argued
that they were entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiffs
failed to state a claim under the First Amendment or the Due Process
2
Clause.'
At the same time, the plaintiffs filed their own motion for summary judgment.' 3 Relying on the Supreme Court's seminal decision in
Pickering v. Board of Education,1 4 in which the Court established standards for terminating government employees for disruptive speech, 15
the plaintiffs argued that the decision to fire them violated their First
6
Amendment rights.'
In denying defendants' motion without prejudice, Judge Sprizzo
was satisfied that the plaintiffs raised sufficient questions about the absence of a neutral decision-maker to warrant a denial of the defen1 7
dants' motion regarding the application of the preclusion doctrines.
8.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).

9.

See BARDOLPH, supra note 7, at 53.

10.

See Locurto, 95 F.Supp.2d at 161.

11.
12.
13.

See id. at 166.
See id. at 168.
See id. at 166.

14.
15.
16.

391 U.S. 563 (1968).
See id.
See Locurto, 95 F.Supp.2d at 166.

17.

See id. at 167.
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He also said that since the City was required to provide the plaintiffs
with a hearing that comported with the notions of due process he
could not conclude that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.' 8
Judge Sprizzo believed that the factual record before the court was
too "murky" to make a definitive decision on either motion.19 Accordingly, he ordered that discovery be completed for the purpose of determining whether the preclusion doctrines or qualified immunity should
be applied. The judge also denied the plaintiffs' First Amendment
20
summary judgment motion because the record was incomplete.
At issue in this case were numerous public statements made by
former Mayor Giuliani and former Commissioners Safir and Von Essen
prior to the administrative hearings. 2 ' These statements indicated that
the termination of the plaintiffs was a foregone conclusion. 2 2 The comments gave substance to the plaintiffs' argument that the application
of the preclusion doctrines and the granting of qualified immunity
never had an opporwere inappropriate in this instance because they
23
tunity to be heard before an impartial forum.
Judge Sprizzo's decision was issued on April 27, 2000 and the defendants wasted no time in filing an appeal with the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on May 9, 2000.24 Following

this, the parties participated in a telephone conference on June 15,
2000 to discuss whether discovery should continue while the appeal
was pending.2 5 During this conference, Judge Sprizzo further defined
his personal concerns when he said: "I really do have difficulty with the
notion that a court that is under the direction, control and supervision
of the mayor and which is bowing to his wishes comports with due
26
process."
18. See id. at 168 n.4.
19. See id. at 168 (quotations added).
20. See id. at 168 n.2.
21. See id. at 167.
22. See Benjamin Weiser, GiulianiFacesDepositions Over Remarks After Parade, N.Y.
TiMEs, Sept. 16, 1998, at B5.
23. See Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Juan C. v. R.C.
Cortines, 679 N.E.2d 1061, 1065 (N.Y. 1977) noting that New York law requires that
parties must have a full and fair opportunity to be heard before collateral estoppel can
be applied).
24. See Defendants' Notice of Appeal, Locurto v. Giuliani, 95 F.Supp.2d 161
(S.D.N.Y.) (98 Civ. 6495 (JES)).
25. See Tr. Telephone Conf. at 2, Locurto v. Giuliani, 95 F.Supp.2d 161, 167
(S.D.N.Y.) (98 Civ. 6495 (JES)).
26. Id. at 5.
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The Second Circuit heard oral arguments on December 11,
By that time, the appeal was focused on two essential questions:
1. Did the district court err in denying the defendants their defense of
qualified immunity?
2. Did the district court properly deny the defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding the alleged due process violations of the
28
plaintiffs' rights at their termination hearings?
On August 27, 2001, in a decision renamed Locurto v. Safir, the
Second Circuit dismissed the defendants' challenge of the district
court's ruling regarding qualified immunity for lack of jurisdiction. 29
But the court also dismissed the plaintiffs' due process claim concerning the lack of a fair hearing, finding that they failed to allege a constitutional violation. 30 In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit
held that a neutral adjudicator is not a necessary component of due
31
process at a pre-termination hearing.
This due process component of the Second Circuit's decision
forms the basis for this case comment. Specifically, in light of Locurto v.
Safir,3 2 how must litigants like Locurto, Steiner and Walters protect
their rights when confronted with apparent bias in agency disciplinary
proceedings?
The comment begins with an overview of the Broad Channel
Parade incident in which the factors that gave rise to the plaintiffs'
claims of bias are identified. Relevant case law is then reviewed to highlight the differences between Federal and New York State standards of
due process in agency hearings. Remedies for confronting bias at the
New York State level are identified and the Second Circuit's application of the case law and state procedures in Locurto v. Safi' 3 is then
described.
Part II of the comment provides a background description of the
events that occurred at the Broad Channel Parade. The discussion in
this section will focus on the conduct of the plaintiffs, the public reactions of the defendants, the procedures, rules and charters that govern
the City's disciplinary process, and the circumstances surrounding the
investigation and hearing process.
Part III of the comment will present a review of the Federal and
New York State cases that have established the standards for due pro2000.27

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See Locurto v. Safir, 262 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 162.
See id. at 170.
See id. at 175.
See id. at 174.
262 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id.
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cess at pre-termination proceedings. The presentation will begin with a
review of the applicable United States Supreme Court cases. This will
be followed by an examination of the Circuit court rulings that further
defined the scope of due process rights for pre-termination proceedings. Finally, the section will provide an analysis of relevant New York
case law. The focus of these state cases will be to identify the elements
necessary to prove allegations of bias in pre-termination proceedings.
Part IV of the comment will present an overview of post-deprivation remedies that are available to plaintiffs under Article 78 of the
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("Article 78").34 The purpose,
scope and limitations of an Article 78 proceeding will be described and
the questions that a plaintiff must raise to move forward with an Article
78 proceeding will be identified.
Part V of the comment will analyze the Second Circuit's application of federal and state case law to the question of whether due process requirements entitled Locurto, Steiner and Walters to a neutral
hearing officer. The section then describes the court's rationale for
determining that the post-deprivation remedies at the state level were
sufficient to protect the interests of the plaintiffs in this instance, thus
making it unnecessary to require
the City to provide a neutral adjudi35
cator for agency hearings.
Part VI closes the discussion with some comments regarding the
implications of Locurto v. Safir on plaintiffs confronted with apparent
bias in agency disciplinary proceedings. The section argues that the
Second Circuit's decision makes it futile to attempt to redress due process claims of this nature in federal court and that litigants are now
compelled to rely on remedies offered by the state to overcome unfair
treatment by local officials.
II.

THE

BROAD CHANNEL PARADE AND ITS AFTERMATH

Broad Channel is a quiet island community south of Kennedy International Airport in New York City.3 6 According to the 1990 census,

all but about 1 percent of Broad Channel's 1,620 residents are white,
with the census listing only 23 Latino residents and no African-Ameri37
cans or Asian-Americans living in the community.
34.
35.
36.

N.Y.C.P.L.Rt 78 (Consol. 2001).
See Locurto, 262 F.3d at 174.
See David W. Chen, Officers and Firemen Wore Blackface on Float, Officials Say, N.Y.

TIMES, Sept. 11, 1998, at BI.

37.

See id.
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The Broad Channel Volunteer Fire Department and Ambulance
38
Corps. sponsored the parade in which the plaintiffs were involved.
The parade "had a long tradition as a freewheeling, anything-goes kind
of open-air party, in which Jews, Asians and gay people, among other
39
groups, have been parodied."
Joseph Locurto, a lifelong resident of Broad Channel, was a police
officer from February 1994 until his termination on October 10,
1998.40 During his four and one-half years of service, he was never involved in any violent or racial incidents while on duty.4 1 Locurto acknowledged that he had participated in the Broad Channel parade
before and even testified that he and his friends had won the award for
42
the funniest entry in 1996 with a float entitled "Gooks of Hazzard."
In this float, the participants mocked Asians, donning straw hats,
43
throwing rice and waving chopsticks as they drove by spectators.
Robert Steiner and Jonathan Walters were also lifelong residents
of Broad Channel. Steiner joined the Fire Department in February
1996 and Walters was a fireman for eight years prior to this incident;
both were terminated on October 26, 1998. 44 Neither Steiner nor Walters had ever been involved in a racial incident while working, but they
both admitted participating in the Broad Channel Parade in each of
45
the previous nine years.
On September 6, 1998, the evening before the parade, Locurto
and Walters attended a barbecue at Steiner's house where they discussed the possibility of designing a float for the parade the following
afternoon. 46 When Locurto, an Italian-American, left the barbecue to
work the night shift at the 104th Precinct, he was under the impression
that the float would be named "Gottizilla" and that it would depict
Italian-Americans with a Godzilla theme. 47 However, when Locurto arrived at Steiner's house the following day, the float theme had been
38. See Kit R. Roane, Judge Urges Firingof Police Officer Who Rode Racist ParadeFloat,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1998 at B3.
39.
Chen, supra note 36.
40. See Locurto v. Giuliani, 95 F.Supp.2d 161, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
41.
See id.
42. See Roane, supra note 38.
43. See Kit R. Roane, Police Officer Is Dismissed Over Float, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1998,
at 37 [hereinafter "Officer is Dismissed Over Float"].
44. See Locurto, 95 F.Supp.2d at 163.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 163-64.
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changed to "Black to the Future: 2098."48 The plaintiffs alleged that
the change was made because the "Gottizilla" float could not be com49
pleted in time.
The parade commenced at approximately 1:30 p.m. on September 7, 1998.50 The plaintiffs' float was the last in line and did not start
off until 2:00 p.m. 5 1 Locurto, Steiner and Walters were among a dozen
men riding the float who wore blackface and afro wigs while eating
52
fried chicken and throwing watermelon to the crowd.
The entire parade route would have taker an hour to traverse.
However, the parade was cancelled at 2:30 p.m. due to heavy rain.5 3 So
the "Black to the Future" float never arrived at the viewing table where
local politicians were waiting to judge the participants. 54 An estimated
3,000 spectators were on hand for the mile-and-a-half parade. An amateur video camera photographer captured the event on a videotape
that found its way to the local CBS-TV news broadcast the following
night. 5 5 It was this telecast that brought the incident to the attention of
Mayor Giuliani and Commissioners Safir and Von Essen.
After the airing of the videotape, Mayor Giuliani immediately condemned the participants. He was quoted as saying: "I am outraged by
this disgusting display of racism," and "I want to assure New Yorkers
that this kind of behavior will not be tolerated."5 6 The next day, after it
became known that off-duty City police and firemen might have been
57
involved, Mayor Giuliani appeared at a town meeting in Queens.
While there, he was quoted as saying, "From what I know, there are city
employees involved... [a]nd I would suggest to them that they come
forward, tender their resignations and leave city government, because
if we catch them and I suspect we will catch some of them
they are going to be fired immediately."58 He further stated, "I've spoken
to Commissioners Safir and Von Essen ... and we all agree that any
police officer, firefighter or other city employee involved in this dis48.

See id. at 164.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Locurto, 95 F.Supp.2d at 164.
See id.
See id.
See Roane, supra note 38.
See Locurto, 95 F.Supp.2d at 164.
Id.
See Chen, supra note 36.

56.
57.
58.

GiulianiJoinsAttack on ParadeFloat, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1998, at B5.
See Chen, supra note 36.
See Chen, supra note 36 (emphasis added).
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gusting display of racism should be removed from positions of respon59
sibility immediately... They will be fired."
On the same day Mayor Giuliani made these statements, plaintiff
Locurto became aware that the New York City Police Department
("NYPD") wanted to speak to him regarding his involvement in the
parade. 60 He contacted counsel and came forward, but before being
asked any questions about his involvement in the parade, he was immediately suspended without pay.6 1 Following this action, Mayor Giuliani
stated publicly, "The only way this guy gets back on the force is if the
Supreme Court of the United States tells us to put him back."62 Steiner
and Walters experienced similar fates when they too were suspended
from the New York City Fire Department ("FDNY').63 After the plain64
tiffs' suspensions, the NYPD filed two formal charges against Locurto
65
and the FDNY filed one formal charge against Steiner and Walters.
The New York City Charter, the Rules of the City of New York and
the Administrative Code of the City of New York each promulgate procedures under which disciplinary hearings for police department and
66
fire department employees are to be organized and conducted.
Under the Charter, all employees are entitled to an "adjudication"
proceeding in which the legal rights, duties and privileges of the parties are required by law to be determined by the agency on a record
and after an opportunity for a hearing. 67 The parties are to be afforded an opportunity for a hearing within a reasonable time and ac68
corded due process of law.
Hearing officers oversee departmental adjudications but their role
is limited to making findings of fact; they are not the final decisionmakers. 69 The hearing officers may only make recommendations to
59. Locurto, 95 F.Supp.2d at 164 (emphasis added) (quoting David W. Chen, Officers and Firemen Wore Blackface on Float, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1998, at BI).
60. See id. at 164.
61.
See id.
62. Kit R. Roane, Suspended Police Officer Apologizes, CallingFloat a 'BigMistake', N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 13, 1998, at B1.
63. See Locurto, 95 F.Supp.2d at 165.
64. See id. at 164.
65.
See id. at 165.
66. See NYC CHARTER § 1 (2001); 38 RCNY § 15-01 (2001); 3 RCNY § 2-01 (2001);
NYC ADMIN. CODE §1-102 (2001).
67.
NYC CHARTER § 1041 (2001).
68. NYC CHARTER § 1046(c) (1).
69. NYC CHARTER § 1046(e).
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the agency involved - the head of which may adopt, reject or mod70
ify any such recommendation as he or she sees fit.
Curiously, under the Rules, the NYPD and FDNY have two different methods of assigning departmental hearing officers. The Police
have a deputy commissioner from within the Department presiding
over their adjudications, 71 while the Fire Department utilizes an administrative law judge from outside the agency. 72 In each case, however, the respective Commissioners have the final say in the
disciplinary process. 73
On October 5, 1998, plaintiff Locurto's hearing took place at One
Police Plaza.74 He was charged with "conduct prejudicial to the good
order ...of the Department" and "associating with ...organization(s)
advocating hatred." 75 During his hearing, Locurto's attorneys argued
that he had been pre-judged by the Commissioner, that the punishment did not fit the offense, and that his participation in the parade
76
was an expression of his right to free speech.
Following the hearing, Deputy Commissioner of Trials, Rae
Downes Koshetz, found Locurto guilty of the first charge and dismissed the second. 7 7 She forwarded her recommendation to Commissioner Safir, who adopted it and signed an order of termination
effective October 10, 1998.78
Similarly, plaintiffs Steiner and Walters were charged with "bringing reproach and discredit to the Fire Department, violating their
oaths of office, and engaging in conduct which aroused racial hatred." 79 Their two-day hearing began on October 6, 1998 before Administrative Law Judge Rosemarie Maldonado.8 0 Notwithstanding
alleged statements by Commissioner Von Essen that "his hands were
tied" by Mayor Giuliani's termination order, Judge Maldonado rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that they were being fired in retaliation
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See id.
38 RCNY § 15-02 (2001).
3 RCNY § 2-01(a) (2001).
See NYC ADMIN. Code § 14-115(a) (2001); 3 RCNY § 2-01(b) (2001).
See Locurto v. Giuliani, 95 F.Supp.2d 161, 164-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Id. at 164.
See Roane, Officer is Dismissed Over Float, supra note 43.
See Locurto, 95 F.Supp.2d at 165.

78.

See id.

79.
80.

Id.
6 City Law 66 (2000).
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for their speech.8 1 She forwarded a termination recommendation to
Commissioner Von Essen that he adopted on October 26, 1998, and
82
the plaintiffs were fired immediately.
All three men then filed their Section 1983 actions and moved for
summary judgment, claiming that they were unconstitutionally fired
for exercising their free speech rights while off duty and out of uniform.8 3 The City defended that each was fired for his conduct, not
speech, and moved for summary judgment as well.8 4 As stated previously, Judge Sprizzo refused to enter judgment and held that the fairness of the administrative trials was at issue because of the prior public
85
comments made by the Mayor and Commissioners.

III.

CASE LAW REVIEW -

DUE PROCESS AT PRE-

TERMINATION HEARINGS

Locurto, Steiner and Walters rested their due process claim on
the allegation that the Commissioners, both of whom possessed final
authority to review their disciplinary adjudications, predetermined to
fire them prior to any administrative hearing. 86 They argued that due
process required that they be afforded a neutral decision-maker at
their department hearings and that the adoption of a recusal mechanism by the defendants was necessary to safeguard their rights. 87 However, the Second Circuit, relying on a number of Supreme Court and
88
Circuit Court cases, declined to embrace such a requirement.
A.

United States Supreme Court Cases

In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, the Supreme Court
established a minimal due process standard for pre-termination hearings.8 9 In Loudermill, the plaintiff, a security guard with civil service status, received a letter notifying him that he was being terminated from
employment for failing to state on hisjob application that he had been
convicted of a felony. 90 At the time of his dismissal, the plaintiff was
81.
82.
83.

See Locurto, 95 F.Supp.2d at 165.
See id.
See id. at 166.

84.
85.

See id.
See id.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See
See
See
See
See

Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 171 (2d Cir. 2001).
id. at 173.
id.
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
id. at 535.
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not afforded an opportunity to respond to the charge. 91 After the
Cleveland Civil Service Commission upheld the termination, the plaintiff, rather than filing for judicial review in the state courts, brought
suit in the Federal District Court claiming that he had been denied
due process.9 2 The District Court dismissed his claim holding that the
post-termination procedures available to the plaintiff in state court ad98
equately protected his rights.

In affirming the District Court's decision, the Supreme Court held
that pre-termination hearings need not definitively resolve the propriety of an employee discharge. 9 4 The Court concluded that the essential
purpose of such a hearing was merely to determine whether there are
reasonable grounds to believe the charges against the employee are
true.95 Thus, the Court held that due process concerns are satisfied

when the employee is afforded (1) notice of the charges, (2) an explanation of the employer's evidence, and (3) an opportunity to be
heard. 96 The Court noted that to require more would intrude on the
government's interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee. 97 In reaching this result, the Court relied heavily on the fact
that the state afforded the plaintiff a full adversarial hearing subsequent to termination. 98
In Gilbert v. Homar, the Court affirmed the limited due process
requirements of pre-termination proceedings. 99 In Gilbert, state police
arrested the respondent, a college campus police officer, for drug possession and his employer immediately suspended him.' 0 0 Although the
criminal charges were dismissed five days later, the officer's suspension
remained in effect.' 0 The respondent met with the chief of the campus police and was given an opportunity to tell his side of the story.' 0 2
Following this meeting, he was removed from the police department
0
and demoted to a college groundskeeper position.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See id.
See id. at 536.
See id.
See id. at 545.
See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46.
See id. at 546.
See id.
See id.

99.

See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997).

100.
101.
102.
103.

See id. at 926-27.
See id. at 927.
See id.
See id.
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The respondent filed a Section 1983 action contending that his
employer failed to provide him with notice and an opportunity to be
heard prior to suspending him. 10 4 His employer then filed a motion
for summary judgment which was granted by the District Court. 10 5 The
Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the respondent should have
been provided with a hearing prior to his suspension. 10 6 In reversing
the Court of Appeals decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the three
due process requirements established in Loudermill and held that the
respondent was only entitled to a very limited hearing prior to
07
termination.1
B.

Circuit Court Cases

In Garraghty v. Jordan, the Fourth Circuit rejected a plaintiff's
claim that his First Amendment rights were violated when he was allegedly suspended in retaliation for criticizing the institution's policies
and engaging in union activities.10 8 The plaintiff, a prison warden, was
suspended for insubordination for five days. 10 9 Following his suspension, the plaintiff initiated a Section 1983 action seeking a declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief.'1 0 The plaintiff argued that since the
judge in the informal disciplinary proceeding was the victim of his alleged insubordination he was denied due process. 1 The court noted
that, even though the plaintiff's suspension was temporary, it was not
de minimis and that he was therefore entitled to a hearing."12 However, relying on Loudermill, the court upheld the disciplinary action,
finding that the government's interest in expeditious discipline did
not, in this instance, warrant pre-deprivation proceedings before a
1 13
neutral party.
Similarly, in Schacht v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, the Seventh Circuit rejected a plaintiff's claim that internal bias by his employer violated his right to due process in a pre-termination
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 928.
Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 928.
id.
id.
Garraghty v. Jordan, 830 F.2d 1295, 1302 (4th Cir. 1987).
id. at 1297.
id. at 1298.
id. at 1299.
id. at 1300.
id. at 1302; Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
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proceeding. 114 In Schacht, the plaintiff, a corrections officer, was terminated after being suspended for allegedly stealing some pens, two garbage bags and a three-ounce tube of toothpaste from his employer. 1 15
The plaintiff alleged that prison officials harbored animosity toward
him because he had confronted fellow officers who failed to adhere to
prison rules." 6 The court held that because adequate post-termination
remedies were available on the state level, the plaintiff's internal bias
17
claim was doomed'
Again in Cronin v. Town ofAmesbury, the First Circuit rejected the
demoted plaintiff's claim that he was the victim of a biased pre-termination hearing.' 18 In Cronin, a police chief was terminated for denying, under oath, that he had written a pornographic letter found in his
desk. 119 Following his termination, the plaintiff filed a Section 1983
suit claiming that he had been deprived of due process. The court affirmed the dismissal and summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the state provided an adequate post-deprivation
120
remedy to protect the plaintiffs rights.
C. New York State Cases
While Federal courts have rejected the notion that a neutral adjudicator is an essential component of due process at pre-termination
proceedings, 12 ' this position contrasts sharply with New York case law.
The courts in New York have been loath to uphold the conclusions of
hearing officers when public statements or evidence of bias indicate a
predetermination of guilt.

22

In In People ex rel. Packwood v. Riley, the plaintiff police chief contested his termination from employment claiming that his hearing was
conducted by a biased hearing officer.' 23 In Riley, the chief was fired
114. See Schacht v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 175 F.3d 497, 503 (7th Cir. 1999).
115. See id. at 500.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 503.
118. See Cronin v. Town of Amesbury, 81 F.3d 257, 260 n.2 (1st Cir. 1996).
119. See id. at 259.
120. See id. at 260-262.
121. See supra Part III, sections A and B text and accompanying notes.
122. See People ex reL Packwood v. Riley, 133 N.E. 891 (N.Y. 1922); Warder v. Board
of Regents, 423 N.E.2d 352 (N.Y. 1981); 1616 Second Ave. Rest., Inc. v. NewYork State
Liquor Auth., 550 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1990).
123. People ex reL Packwood v. Riley, 133 N.E. 891 (N.Y. 1922).
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thirteen days after the defendant mayor took office. 124 The chief provided evidence that the hearing officer, an appointee of the mayor
who preferred the charges against him, distributed campaign pamphlets on the mayor's behalf promising the chief's removal from office. 1 25 The chief also showed that, upon his appointment to the
position of Commission of Public Safety, the hearing officer changed a
city policy requiring that charges be preferred within thirty days of an
offense.1 26 This permitted the mayor to charge the chief with alleged
12 7
violations that occurred several years prior.
In reversing the lower court that upheld the plaintiff's termination, the Court of Appeals held that a pre-termination hearing is not a
"mere form to precede a predetermined removal."1 28 Rather, a hearing "must be fair in all respects, based upon an impartial review of the
evidence to the exclusion of knowledge possessed by the trier of fact
1 29
and free from prejudicial errors of law."
In In Warder v. Board of Regents, the Court of Appeals established a
two-part test for determining bias in agency proceedings. 130 In Warder,
the petitioners, members of the Unification Church, appealed the New
York Board of Regents' decision denying their application to open a
college seminary. 13 1 They challenged the administrative body's decision on the grounds that it was biased. 132 During the application and
investigation process, two of the regents expressed concern about unresolved charges against the Unification Church regarding its alleged
involvement with the South Korean government and the Korean Cen133
tral Intelligence Agency.
The Court of Appeals held that in order to prove that an administrative decision was biased there must be (1) a factual demonstration
to support the allegation of bias and (2) proof that the outcome
flowed from it.134 While the Warder court found neither element satis124. See id.
125. See id. at 892.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 891.
128. Id. at 892 (quoting People ex rel. Mitchel v. La Grange, 37 N.Y.S. 991(N.Y.
App. Div. 1896)).
129. Id.
130. 423 N.E.2d 352 (N.Y. 1981).
131. See id. at 354.
132. See id. at 355-56.
133. See id. at 354-355.
134. See id. at 358.
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fled in this case, it did affirm the validity of this two-prong standard as a
means for determining whether a hearing decision was biased.' 3 5
The Court of Appeals also addressed administrative hearing bias
in In re 1616 Second Avenue Restaurant.'3 6 This suit arose from the
highly publicized Robert Chambers "preppie murder" case in the
1980s. 13 7 The trial revealed that both the suspect and victim had been
drinking at a nightclub controlled by the corporate petitioner prior to
the homicide.' 3 8 After Chambers was convicted, the nightclub became
the target of heightened scrutiny by the New York City Police Department's Social Club Task Force and the petitioner was charged with
serving alcohol to minors.1 3 9 After the charges were sustained at a local
hearing, the petitioner appealed to the Commission of the New York
State Liquor Authority. 140 Prior to the appeal hearing, one of the commissioners testified before the New York State Senate and made statements that indicated he had prejudged the charges against the
nightclub. 14 1 The petitioner asked the commissioner to recuse himself.
The commissioner refused and the charges against the plaintiff were
sustained. 142
The Court of Appeals reversed the Commission's finding. 143 The
court held that an impartial decision-maker is a core guarantee of due
process and this was fully applicable to adjudicatory proceedings
before administrative agencies.'4 The court further held that "where,
as in this case, an administrative official has made public comments
concerning a specific dispute that is to come before him in his adjudicatory capacity, he will be disqualified on the grounds of
prejudgment. ..."145

135. See id.
136. 1616 Second Ave. Rest., Inc. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 550 N.E.2d 910
(N.Y. 1990).
137. Id. at 911.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 911.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 912.
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NEW YoRK CIVIL PRACTICE AND ARTICLE 78146

An Article 78 proceeding is among the most popular and important devices in New York practice because it supercedes the common
law writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari. 147 First adopted in
1937, it was meant to replace the old writs with a uniform device for
challenging the activities of an administrative agency in court. 148 Since
the administrative agency is the primary device today for conducting
the business of government, Article 78 offers a mechanism by which
aggrieved persons can confront government actions they believe are
1 49
unfair or improper.
The statute is so broad in scope it does not even purport to name
the agencies within its scope.1 50 It refers to its targets as every "body or
officer", which it defines as "every court, tribunal, board, corporation,
officer or other person, or aggregation of persons, whose actions may
be affected" by an Article 78 proceeding. 15 1 Any of those bodies who
would have been affected by any of the superceded writs is today subject to Article 78.152
C.P.L.R. 7803 prescribes the scope of Article 78 review in the form
of four questions. 153 These questions, which encompass the only issues
154
that may be raised in an Article 78 proceeding, are listed as follows:
1. Whether the body or officer failed to perform a duty enjoined upon
155
it by the law;
2. Whether the body or officer proceeded, is proceeding or is about to
156
proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction;
3. Whether a determination was made in violation of lawful procedure,
was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an
abuse of discretion, including abuse of discretion as to the measure or
mode of penalty or discipline imposed; 157 or
146.

N.Y.C.P.L.R. 78 (Consol. 2001)

147.

See DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE 916 (3d ed. 1999).

148.
149.

See id.
See id.

150.

See id.

151.
152.
153.

N.Y.C.P.L.R. 7802(a) (Consol. 2001).
See SIEGEL, supra note 147, at 916.
N.Y.C.P.L.R. 7803 (Consol. 2001).

154.

See id.

155.

See id.

156.

See id.

157.

See id.
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4. Whether a determination made as a result of a hearing held, and at
which evidence was taken, pursuant to direction of law is, on the entire
58
record, supported by substantial evidence.'
Under Question 3 of C.P.L.R. 7803, a litigant can bring an action
for procedural violations that occur in agency hearings. 159 Similarly,
this subdivision authorizes a review of whether there was an "abuse of
discretion as to the measure or mode of penalty or discipline
imposed."1 60
Most Article 78 proceedings are resolved on papers alone because
they rarely present an issue of fact requiring a trial.' 6 1 But C.P.L.R.
7804(h) recognizes that a factual issue may require adjudication and
provides that "if a triable issue of fact is raised . . .it shall be tried
62
forthwith."1
An Article 78 proceeding culminates in ajudgment that allows for
a wide variety of beneficial results. 163 The judgment may grant the petitioner the relief that he is entitled or may dismiss the proceeding on
the merits or with leave to renew.' 64 If the proceeding was brought to
review a determination, the judgment may annul or confirm the determination in whole or in part, or modify it.165 It may also prohibit specified actions by the respondent. 66 With regard to restitution or
damages, any relief granted must be incidental to the primary relief
sought and must be similar to what the petitioner may recover in a
separate action or proceeding suable in the supreme court against the
same party on the same set of facts.' 67 Thus, by bringing an Article 78
proceeding the petitioner may benefit from a full range of possible
remedies.
It is important to note, however, that the statute of limitations for
bringing an Article 78 proceeding is short. It is four months, as governed by C.P.L.R. § 217(1).168 Under this rule, the four month period
starts to run when "the determination to be reviewed becomes final
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See id.
See SIEGEL, supra note 147, at 928.
Id. at 929 (quotations in original).
See id. at 940.
N.Y.C.P.L.1. 7804(h) (Consol. 2001).
See SEIGEL, supra note 147, at 941.
N.Y.C.P.L.R. 7806 (Consol. 2001).
See id.

166.
167.

See id.
See id.

168.

N.Y.C.P.L.1R § 217(1) (Consol. 2001).
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and binding upon the petitioner... or after the respondent's refusal,
upon the demand of the petitioner or the person whom he represents,
to perform its duty." 169 The "determination" of which C.P.L.R.
§ 217(1) speaks is open to varying interpretations as to when the point
finality will start the four month limitation. 170 Thus, litigants must be
particularly sensitive to time issues so as not to run afoul of the brief
171
statute of limitations period.
V.

LOCURTO v.

SAFIR

-

CASE ANALYsis

As stated previously, when the appeal of Locurto v. Giuliani
reached the Second Circuit the argument focused on the issues of
qualified immunity and due process. 172 The plaintiffs and defendants
had filed cross-motions for summary judgment, but the district court
denied them. 173 In his denial, Judge Sprizzo noted that, at such an
early stage, the record was too incomplete for him to determine
1 74
whether the pre-termination hearings comported with due process.
Following Judge Sprizzo's ruling, Mayor Giuliani, Safir and Von
Essen "brought an interlocutory appeal of the district court's order in
so far as it denied their defense of qualified immunity." 175 The plaintiffs brought a counter-motion to dismiss the appeal for a lack of appellate jurisdiction. 17 6 The Second Circuit concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction over the appeal to the extent it related to the plaintiffs'
First Amendment claim. 177 But the court also denied the plaintiffs'
due process claim holding that a neutral adjudicator is not a necessary
1 78
element of due process at a pre-termination hearing.
A.

Lack ofJurisdictionfor Quafied Immunity

The Second Circuit began its analysis by noting that an interlocutory order is immediately appealable if it "(1) conclusively determines
the disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue completely separable from the merits of that action, and (3) would effectively be unre169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
SIEGAL, supra note 147, at 933-35.
See id. at 936.
See Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir. 2001).
See Locurto v. Giuliani, 95 F.Supp.2d 161, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

See

174.

See id. at 168 n.4.

175.

Locurto, 264 F.3d at 162.

176.
177.
178.

See id.
See id.
See id.
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viewable on appeal from final judgment."1 7 9 The court noted that
under the qualified immunity doctrine, "government officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known."18 °

The court observed that the qualified immunity doctrine is meant
to strike a balance "between the need, on one hand to hold responsible public officials exercising their power in a wholly unjustified manner and, on the other hand, to shield officials responsibly attempting
to perform their public duties in good faith from having to explain
their actions to the satisfaction of the jury."18 1 The court noted that
because the doctrine is a shield from the burdens of discovery and
trial, as well as liability, the denial of immunity is immediately review18 2
able so long as it turns on a question of law.
Conversely, the court concluded that a defendant may not appeal
a summary judgment order insofar as the order determines whether or
not the pretrial record sets forth a "genuine" issue of fact because such
an order is not separable from the merits of the claim.' 8 3 Thus, the
court focused its analysis ofJudge Sprizzo's decision to deny the defendants' qualified immunity defense motion on whether the denial
184
turned on a question of law or fact.
The court observed that plaintiffs argued that the decision to ter185
minate them was unjustified under Pickering v. Board of Education.
Under Pickering, a government employer may fire an employee for
speaking on a matter of public concern if "(1) the employer's prediction of disruption is reasonable; (2) the potential disruptiveness is
enough to outweigh the value of the speech; and (3) the employer
took action against the employee based on this disruption and not in
179. Locurto, 264 F.3d at 162 (quoting Coopers & Lyband v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
468 (1978)).
180. Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
181. Id. at 162-63 (quoting Kaminsky v. Rosenblum, 929 F.2d 922, 924-25 (2d Cir.
1991) (citing Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)) (L. Hand, G.J.)).
182. See id. at 163.
183. Id. (quotingJohnson v.Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 314, 319-20 (1995)); accord Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 475 (2d Cir. 1995).
184. See id.
185. See id. at 161; Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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retaliation for the speech."1 8 6 The court noted that even if the Pickering
balancing test is resolved in the employer's favor, an employer can still
be held liable if employees can show they were disciplined in retalia1 87
tion for speech rather than out of fear of the disruption.
The plaintiffs' argument centered on the lack of evidence that
their speech disrupted the efficient functioning of either the Police or
Fire Departments and that the public comments of Mayor Giuliani had
prejudged their case. 188 They contended that this evidence demonstrated that any concern of disruption to the departments involved was
1 89
merely a pretext to conceal the defendants' retaliatory motives.
Conversely, Mayor Giuliani and the other defendants argued that the
plaintiffs were collaterally estopped by the prior administrative determinations, and even if they were not, the plaintiffs failed to state valid
First Amendment or due process claims. 190 Additionally, the defendants asserted that they were entitled to immunity because their actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law. 19 1
The court observed that instead of evaluating the issue from a
Pickering standpoint, Judge Sprizzo discussed the evidence that indicated the defendants had prejudged the plaintiffs' disciplinary charges
and concluded that he was unable to reach a conclusion based on the
incomplete record at hand. 192 The court concluded that Judge
Sprizzo's decision reflected a belief that the claims involved a question
of fact as to the retaliatory motive of the defendants and, this being the
193
case, he was precluded from awarding summary judgment.
The court noted that resolution of a First Amendment retaliation
claim on a summary judgment motion may not be possible if the plaintiff introduces sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material
fact on the question of a defendant's improper intent.' 9 4 Thus, the
court concluded that since Locurto, Steiner and Walter's First Amend186. Locurto, 264 F.3d at 166 (quotingJeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir.
1995)).
187. See id. (quoting Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 161-62, 164 (2d Cir. 1999));
accord Cra.ford-E1 v. Britton 523 U.S. 574, 585 (1998).
188. See Locurto, 264 F.3d at 161.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191.
See id. at 161.
192. See id. at 167 (citing Locurto, 95 F.Supp.2d at 167-68).
193. See id. at 167.
194. See id. at 167 (citing Sheppard v. Beerman, 94 F.3d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1996)).
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ment claim turned on an issue of fact rather than a question of law the
195
defendant's appeal must be dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction.
B.

The Due Process Claim

The plaintiffs' due process claim rested on the allegation that Police Commissioner Safir and Fire Commissioner Von Essen, both of
whom possessed final authority to review their disciplinary adjudications, predetermined to fire them prior to any hearing.' 9 6 They contended that these defects could have been prevented, and a neutral
adjudication assured, had they adopted appropriate recusal procedures.' 97 Conversely, the defendant's argued that due process was satisfied because the plaintiffs could have brought suit in New York to
remedy the alleged bias in an Article 78 proceeding. 98
The court's due process review began with an analysis of pre-termination hearing case law. The court observed that tenured employees
possess a constitutionally protected property interest in their positions
and are terminable only for cause.' 99 Accordingly, the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a state or local government afford "some kind of hearing" prior to depriving them of a
significant liberty or property interest. 20 0 But the court further noted
20
that the required hearing in such cases is a limited one. '
The court observed that procedural due process in a pre-termination hearing is satisfied if the government provides notice and a limited opportunity to be heard prior to termination, so long as a full
adversarial hearing is provided afterwards. 20 2 The court noted that the
plaintiffs were unable to point to any persuasive authority to support
their assertion that due process required a neutral adjudicator at an
administrative hearing. 20 3 The court concluded that since "[n] o subsequent decisions from our Circuit or the other circuits have held that
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See id. at 170.
See id. at 171.
See id.
See id. at 172.
See id. at 171 ( citing Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-29 (1997)).
See id. (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,

299 (1981)) (quotation in original).

201. See id.
202. See id. (citing Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-46
(1985)).
203. See id. at 175.
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such a neutral adjudicator is a necessary component of due process at
20 4
a pre-termination hearing. We hold that it is not."
The fact that New York afforded a post-deprivation remedy in the
form of an Article 78 proceeding had substantial bearing on the
court's conclusions regarding the plaintiffs' due process claim. 20 5 The
court observed that "an Article 78 proceeding permits a petitioner to
submit affidavits and other written evidence, and where a material issue of fact is raised, to have a trial of the disputed issue, including
constitutional claims." 20 6 Additionally, the court noted that in an Article 78 proceeding a petitioner may also raise claims that the agency
adjudicator was biased or had prejudged the outcome of the case or
that the ruling against the petitioner was slanted by the adjudicator's
20 7
refusal to recuse herself.
The court concluded that an Article 78 proceeding constitutes a
20 8
wholly adequate post-deprivation hearing for due process purposes.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs' due process claim was dismissed for failure
20 9
to allege a constitutional issue.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that most people would agree that the actions of
Locurto, Steiner and Walters in this case were crude, tasteless, and
most likely racist and this case comment has not sought to argue otherwise. However, the facts make equally clear that the behavior of former
Mayor Giuliani and Commissioners Safir and Von Essen gave the plaintiffs sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of a material fact that
they were facing biased hearings and that their terminations were a
foregone conclusion.
The Second Circuit's decision in Locurto v. Safir lays to rest any
debate over how best to litigate due process claims arising out of bias
pre-termination proceedings such as those confronted by the plaintiffs
204. Id. at 174.
205. See id. at 172-75.
206. Id. at 174-75 (citing Gudema v. Nassau County, 163 F.3d 717, 724 (2d Cir.
1998); 1616 Second Ave. Rest., Inc. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 550 N.E.2d 910,
911-14 (N.Y. 1990); Hughes v. Suffolk County Dep't Civil Serv. 545 N.E.2d 625 (N.Y.
1989)).
207. See Locurto, 95 F.Supp.2d at 174-75 (citing Wood v. Cosgrove, 655 N.Y.S.2d
1004 (2d Dep't 1997)).
208. See id. at 175.
209. See id.

2001-2002]

LOCURTO V. GUILTANI

in this case. The court's message is clear - advocates must rely on
state remedies.
The court's decision that a neutral adjudicator is not an essential
component in a pre-termination proceeding affirms the low standard
of due process that currently exists on the federal level and leaves no
doubt that it is futile to raise such claims in a Section 1983 proceeding.2 10 Thus, Locurto v. Safir is instructive because it serves notice on
attorneys that they must look to state statutes to protect the essential
due process rights of their clients when confronting bias in agency
hearings. And as the Second Circuit observed, for Locurto, Steiner and
an Article 78 proceeding.2 1 '
Walters, that meant only one thing Thomas E. Kemble

210. See Locurto, 264 F.3d at 174.
211. See id. at 175 (citing Hellenic Am. Neighborhood Action Comm. v. City of New
York, 101 F.3d 877, 881 (2d Cir. 1996)).

